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Abstract Part of the standard protection of decisionally incapacitated research
subjects is a prohibition against enrolling them unless surrogate decision makers
authorize it. A common view is that surrogates primarily ought to make their
decisions based on what the decisionally incapacitated subject would have wanted
regarding research participation. However, empirical studies indicate that surrogate
predictions about such preferences are not very accurate. The focus of this article is
the significance of surrogate accuracy in the context of research that is not expected
to benefit the research subject. We identify three morally relevant asymmetries
between being enrolled and not being enrolled in such non-beneficial research, and
conclude that when there is a non-negligible probability that surrogates’ predictions
are wrong, it will generally be better to err on the side of not authorizing enrollment.
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Introduction
Non-therapeutic research, or more broadly, research that is not expected to provide
any benefits to the research subject, raises serious ethical concerns when it involves
individuals that cannot provide valid informed consent to their participation. The
moral justification for allowing such non-beneficial1 research, it is typically
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obviously does not reflect the fact that studies may often contain both beneficial and non-beneficial
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evaluate the argument of this article.
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acknowledged, must go beyond pointing out that the relevant research is important
to those who may benefit from the results. Codes of research ethics incorporate to
that effect various safeguards, including requirements of ethical review, limits on
acceptable risks and burdens, etc. Part of the standard protection package is also a
prohibition against research that has not been authorized by a legal representative,
or surrogate decision maker—a requirement most notably expressed in the highly
influential Declaration of Helsinki (art. 28) [2].
The very point of having a surrogate consider whether or not to consent is to
ensure that the prospective research subject’s views and interests are represented
when those individuals are not themselves able to express such views or protect
those interests. Differently put, surrogates are not supposed to be the vehicles by
which research, health care, etc. advance their interests. On the contrary, the very
function of surrogates is to act as gatekeepers against society not giving due
consideration to the interests of the research subject. It is less clear, of course,
how a surrogate decision maker best discharges his or her responsibilities towards
a decisionally incapacitated individual when it comes to taking a stand on
research enrollment. A widely endorsed idea, however, is that surrogates primarily
ought to make their decision based on what the decisionally incapacitated subject
did want (before the onset of incapacity), or would have wanted had he or she
had capacity [3, 4]. From this viewpoint it clearly matters whether surrogates are
accurate when trying to identify the preferences of individuals lacking capacity,
that is, whether the decisionally incapacitated really did or would have the wishes
that surrogates believe they did or would have. Empirical studies have addressed
this issue of surrogate accuracy with regard to research participation [5–7].
Although there is much to be said about the methodological challenges of
empirically assessing surrogate accuracy in general [8–10]—the typical study
design is one where potential surrogates are asked to guess what preferences
loved ones (with presumed capacity) say they have for various hypothetical
scenarios—the studies do indicate that the accuracy is not that impressive, and
this has been a source of worry. Accordingly, these results have led some
commentators to suggest that we should find ways to improve surrogates’ ability
to correctly predict whether individuals lacking capacity would consent to
research participation [6, 11].
No doubt, improving upon surrogates’ ability to identify the hypothetical wishes
of would-be research subjects is a worthwhile enterprise. However, unless such
predictions can be made foolproof (which is unlikely), educational and other efforts
to attain greater accuracy would have to be supplemented with principles for
determining how surrogates ought to proceed when substituted judgments are
uncertain/unreliable. In this article, we explain why the prospects of being right
about what the person would want is not the only relevant consideration when a
surrogate is to decide whether or not to authorize the enrollment of a decisionally
incapacitated research subject under the standard regulatory safeguards. In the
context of non-beneficial research, there are morally relevant asymmetries between
enrollment and non-enrollment, which also need to be addressed.
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Normatively relevant asymmetries between false positives and false
negatives
Imagine a scenario where the surrogate, in the light of the available evidence, is not
able to tell at all what the decisionally incapacitated person wanted, or would have
wanted if he or she had been able to take a stand on the issue.2 Assume that the
surrogate therefore estimates that there is a fifty percent chance that this person would
have consented to being enrolled in the study. This raises the question whether the
surrogate, on the assumption that standard safeguards are in place, could just as well
flip a coin? We think not. It not only matters how likely it is that he or she is correct,
but also what would happen if the surrogate were to reach a decision based on the
wrong prediction.3 Two types of mistakes must be considered4:
The false positive: The surrogate incorrectly predicts that the individual would
consent to participate in the research, and bases his or her decision on that
prediction.
The false negative: The surrogate incorrectly predicts that the individual
would not consent to participate in the research, and bases his or her decision
on that prediction.5
At first glance, these mistakes may appear equally problematic, as both of them
consist in reaching a decision that is in conflict with the individual’s preferences.
Both mistakes may thus seem to fail to respect the subject’s autonomy6. As it turns
out, however, the false positive involves additional risks, compared to the false
negative. This means that, unless additional relevant asymmetries can be
established, the former should in such circumstances appear worse than the latter.
Below, three risks will be addressed—relating to harm and burden, instrumental-
ization, and human rights violations—which together suggest that it may well be
better to err on the side of non-enrollment, when as a surrogate one is asked to
authorize that a subject is enrolled in non-beneficial research. Those three
considerations are broadly agreed to be morally relevant when it comes to human
subjects in research in general, and unless there are specific reasons to the contrary,
2 For the purposes of the following discussion, there will be no need to distinguish between the distinct
aims of respecting the individual’s past wishes (when he or she had decision-making capacity) and
respecting his or her hypothetical wishes, respectively, and for the most part, we will frame the discussion
in terms of the latter (substituted judgment).
3 Acting in conflict with a person’s wishes does not amount to the same thing as making a decision that is
in conflict with that person’s wishes. In what follows, however, the decision will be assumed to result in
an action congruent with the prediction of the subject’s preferences.
4 It should be noted that surrogate predictions could concern another kind of preference, namely, whether
the subject has (or would have) given the surrogate some leeway when deciding whether or not to approve
enrollment—a preference that many people actually seem to share [12–14], and one that is addressed later
in this article.
5 Notice that not consenting includes the possibility that the person has no opinion whatsoever. Not
saying yes is, after all, not the same as saying no.
6 Julia T. Newman and colleagues take only false positives to threaten the ethical principle of autonomy
for the patient [5]. We take this to be misleading since both scenarios fail to satisfy the principle of
autonomy.
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the assumption has to be that they ought to be important also in surrogates’
protection of the decisionally incapacitated. The asymmetries that we have in mind
should be most easily grasped in the case of total uncertainty, which is why this will
initially be the assumed scenario. We maintain, however, that the basic thrust of the
argument remains valid also in cases where the likelihood of error is smaller, even
though the practical impact of the argument may need to be qualified in some of
those cases. We shall return to the relevant qualifications in the last section.
Harm and burden
When there are no expressions of will in advance, and there is no evidence allowing
the surrogate to reconstruct what the individual would have wanted, the main option
that remains is to consider what would be in the ‘‘best interest’’ of the person
concerned. Just what is in the best interest of a person is obviously a complex and
controversial issue. In research, for example, one may face the question of whether
the research subject will benefit clinically from being part of a study, whether the
fact that the research subject will receive extended health monitoring may outweigh
expected burdens of participation, or whether weight should be given to the
possibility that the subject will subsequently feel good about having been part of
progress being made in the relevant field. As indicated, we believe there is no good
reason to rule out of consideration benefits for the research subject that are not
strictly clinical; for present purposes, we only aim to exclude from the class of
theoretically possible benefits the satisfaction of the individual’s preferences, or
respect for his or her will, as its inclusion would partly collapse the distinction
between substituted judgment and best interests.
The present argument, however, does not depend on specific views about what
kinds of benefit might be worth exploring in research contexts. Whether there is a
significant likelihood of some clinical, psychological, or other kind of benefit should
be open for debate on a case-by-case basis. While we do believe that the burden of
proof in any given case is with those who claim that there are significant enough
prospects of participant benefits, our present argument is based only on the
observation that research often does not offer any benefit to research subjects and
that we need to sort out what principles ought to govern surrogate decisions about
research participation in those cases. We thus make no claims concerning research
participation in general, but only make claims about the asymmetries related to
research acknowledged to be non-beneficial.7
Not expecting that a research subject will benefit from participating in a certain
study only provides half of the picture, when deciding on whether one mistake about
preferences is worse than the other on grounds of wellbeing. Potential downsides to
7 In many real-world situations, there may indeed be some uncertainty as to whether the research subject
will benefit from being enrolled. While the study perhaps is not designed to be therapeutic, for example, it
nonetheless may bring with it some collateral advantages to the participant, if conditions are fortunate
enough. To what extent a possible, but more unlikely than likely, benefit should be taken into
consideration in enrollment decisions under uncertainty is a good question, but it falls outside of the scope
of this article. That future discussion, however, will in a way merely be an extension of the points made in
the present one, about the need to evaluate the seriousness of the different mistakes that can be made.
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being enrolled must also be considered. Medical research typically introduces some
risk of harm to the participants, and virtually all human trials involve some burden
or discomfort, albeit very slight.8 If nothing else, participating typically takes time.
Examinations, surveys, and follow-ups may take only a couple of minutes, but they
may, depending on the nature of the research, take several hours, and research
involvement frequently entails a number of intervention sessions. In addition,
medical research often deals with sensitive personal data, in ways that may threaten
the privacy of the individuals concerned.
Hence, it will generally not be in the best interest of any particular individual to
be enrolled in non-beneficial research. The point is not that typical burdens are
especially damaging; they need not be at all. It does not matter, however, that the
risks and burdens are expected to be minimal, or close to that.9 On anyone’s
account, minimal risks and burdens include risks of harms and burdens that one
would have wished that someone one cares for would not have to endure, unless he
or she had something to gain. If there is no expected benefit, it will surely be in the
interest of a person not having to endure even slight and temporary pain, such as
having one’s blood taken. In addition, there is still no consensus on just what the
notion of minimal risk and burden is supposed to cover [15–17]; hence a surrogate
who takes his or her protective role seriously would do well, for reasons of
precaution, to refuse enrollment whenever there is uncertainty as to the true
meaning of ‘‘minimal risk and burden’’ in a given (non-beneficial) study.
Furthermore, analyses of research risks are typically based on the harms and
burdens expected if everything goes to plan, but the possibility of human oversight
in the practical conduct of research remains, adding another layer of uncertainty to
be considered by the surrogate. If there is significant uncertainty as to what the
individual lacking capacity would have wanted, a surrogate decision maker would
thus seem to be obligated to refuse authorizing research enrollment in what has been
agreed to be non-beneficial research. This would simply be the safer bet, or so it
seems, with respect to the subject’s best interests.
Instrumentalization
The main purpose of conducting research is to promote certain interests, but those
do not (other than by accident or secondarily) coincide with the interests of the
research subject. Research aims at generating knowledge of more general value,
which may or may not be of any use in benefiting the research subject. This
difference between (non-beneficial) research and activities tailored to profit those
directly involved implies that non-beneficial research risks instrumentalizing
decisionally incapacitated research subjects, i.e., using them merely for the benefit
of others. As with regard to perhaps most key concepts in moral philosophy, there is
no agreement on what exactly instrumentalizing someone, using someone merely
8 Obviously there are some exceptions, one being cases where decisional incapacity is due to lack of
consciousness.
9 Contemporary codes of research ethics typically state that non-beneficial research on subjects lacking
capacity may not be conducted if those subjects are exposed to more than minimal risks or burdens. See
The Declaration of Helsinki, art. 28 [2].
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for the benefit of others, amounts to, or should amount to. But there are two distinct
basic lines of thought about how instrumentalization can be avoided.
First, when an individual is sufficiently informed about what is at stake, and
autonomously, without being coerced or acting from a submissive position, consents
to participation in non-beneficial research, this individual can be said to use him- or
herself as a means to others’ ends, and should not be considered instrumentalized in
any morally interesting sense. While consent, or self-determination more generally,
may be associated with other values or purposes as well, instrumentalization is one
threat it is typically acknowledged to protect against. For the decisionally incapac-
itated, such consent is, by definition, not possible, and thus, they do not enjoy this
particular protection against instrumentalization. But certain deviations from the
relevant autonomy ideal—lesser substitutes along the autonomy dimension, as it
were—may still imply that sufficient consideration has been given to the preferences
or perspective of the individual concerned, for him or her not to be instrumentalized.
Notably, it has for example been argued that we can trust that people are not used
merely as means in the morally relevant sense to the extent that we can trust that we
proceed in accordance with accurate substituted judgments [18].
Second, with respect to a person incapable of making autonomous enough
choices, and regardless of whether he or she would have consented, when we see to
it that ‘‘our treatment of this person is governed or guided in sufficiently important
ways by some relevant moral belief or concern [for the well-being or moral claims
of the person so treated],’’ neither then do we seem to use this person merely as a
means to others ends [19]. Clarifying what the ‘‘sufficiently important ways’’ are is
precisely the sort of thing moral philosophers will struggle with. But, for example,
when a toddler is fed at certain times because this is believed to be good for her, this
child is presumably not instrumentalized, even though the decision is made for her,
not by her, and regardless of whether it would make sense to claim that there is
hypothetical consent to that act. However, when there is no consent or any
legitimate substitute for consent, securing respect for individual autonomy, and
when the intervention is before all else guided by scientific concerns, there is a
prima facie case for saying that such a research subject is instrumentalized.
It is one thing to say that involving the decisionally incapacitated in non-
beneficial research may instrumentalize those individuals; it is another thing to say
that instrumentalization should be a concern. That there is something morally wrong
with instrumentalization is an idea that philosophically goes back primarily to
Immanuel Kant, but it seems deeply entrenched in ordinary moral thinking as well.
The main worry here is not that research participation will tangibly disadvantage in
some way the person enrolled, even though the risk of being harmed or burdened is
likely to be greater (all else being equal) in any endeavor that is not primarily meant
to benefit or protect the person involved. The main concern is that the individual
will be otherwise wronged, by being treated in a way that conflicts with his or her
dignity, or in a way that conflicts with what any person, by virtue of his or her
personhood, deserves. No doubt, these ideas involve concepts and assumptions that
are in need of clarification and justification, respectively. The notions of dignity and
personhood are notoriously elusive, and whether all individuals lacking capacity
should be considered persons in the relevant sense, or as having dignity that needs
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protection, has occasionally been questioned.10 Nonetheless, it has been a long-
standing and widespread worry that when researchers make use of those who cannot
validly consent to their research participation in studies agreed not to promise those
individuals any benefits, those researchers exhibit a lack of respect that is morally
objectionable, regardless of whether the research participants will suffer in some
other way.
One might of course object that if the researcher’s intention is noble and attitude
not exploitative—if, for instance, he or she honestly seeks to enroll only people who
would have approved, but mistakenly also enrolls an individual who would not have
done so—the research subject is not instrumentalized. In that case, it might seem,
the researcher just happens, as a matter of bad luck, to act in conflict with what the
research subject in question would have wished. Certainly our notion of
instrumentalization, or at least one common form of the notion, is essentially
about the attitude with which certain choices are made, more so than the actual
effects. But even on that understanding, there is a risk of instrumentalization to
consider, because the more one acknowledges the risk of being wrong, when one
authorizes enrollment of the decisionally incapacitated individual in non-beneficial
research, the more one seems indifferent to whether or not this person will be used
merely as a means to others’ ends.
Anyway, for present purposes, we need not get to the bottom of in what exactly
instrumentalization consists, exactly why it would be morally questionable, or exactly
how questionable it would be. It is sufficient to note that there is a long-standing worry
among ethicists that people are instrumentalized when they are subjected to certain
kinds of research interventions, and that, for all that we know, theremight be something
to that worry, even if we have not yet elaborated it in fully satisfactory ways. Because,
regardless of how one might wish to elaborate this familiar notion of instrumental-
ization, it is obvious that the choice not to enroll a decisionally incapacitated individual
in a research study is not a choice that instrumentalizes this person, all else being
equal—clearly he or she is not at all used by the researcher, for any purpose. The point,
in other words, is not that there is a crystal clear notion of illegitimate instrumental-
ization, such that it has been conclusively shown that decisionally incapacitated
individuals are instrumentalized in that sense when they are enrolled in non-beneficial
research. Rather, the point is that there is a non-negligible risk of such instrumental-
ization in this context, whereas non-enrollment in this respect will be the safe choice, as
this option obviously is not associated with a risk of instrumentalization.
Rights
A third difference between the two mistakes (the false positive and the false
negative) is that only one of them seems to lead to an outcome that may violate
acknowledged human rights. Enrolling someone in research, especially studies in
10 For example, on Kant’s own theory, only rational individuals can be instrumentalized in the morally
troublesome way mentioned above. Although some commentators accept this consequence [20], and
exclude individuals without decision making capacity from their analysis, we see no reason to be faithful
to Kant’s own ideas in the present context. Instead, we find it more reasonable (although not self-evident)
to regard any sentient being as at risk of being instrumentalized.
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the field of medicine, will, as a rule, infringe upon that person’s bodily or
psychological integrity in ways that would normally be regarded unacceptable unless
the individual provided valid informed consent. Recognition of this negative right is
uncontroversial in the human rights tradition, as articulated in, e.g., article 7 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [21]. ‘‘In particular,’’ the
article says, ‘‘no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or
scientific experimentation.’’ Consent, accordingly, plays a central role in interna-
tional conventions as well as national legislation informed by human rights. When
individuals lack decision-making capacity, valid consent is not possible, but the
search for a good enough substitute in the form of accurate conjectures about their
(hypothetical) preferences is an implicit acknowledgment of the right under threat,
or so it would seem.
The point here, it should be stressed, is not that the relevant right ought to be
regarded as absolute. Like with any other recognized right, it may well have to give
way to the satisfaction of other, ultimately stronger, rights of the individual
concerned or of others. For example, other people’s right to health might require
research that necessitates the violation of a research subject’s right not to be
experimented on without consent. The point is just that there is an acknowledged
right under threat, whether that right is defeasible or not. And the existence of such a
right does not depend, we should add, on the right holder having decision-making
capacity. It may seem pointless to uphold certain other rights, such as the positive
right to education, if individuals, due to lack of capacity, have no chance whatsoever
to reap the fruits of exercising those rights. The moral right not to be subjected to
experimentation without consent is not like that, however, since even in cases where
the required capacities for valid consent are absent, there is an obvious purpose to
protecting the individual’s bodily or psychological integrity.
Is there, then, a corresponding right to be enrolled in research? For what it is
worth, no such right is mentioned in contemporary codes and conventions. And
neither would it make much sense to recognize a general claim to being offered to
participate in research. For one thing, it is hard to see what strong enough individual
interest would be served by the recognition of such a right. Second, in order for an
individual to have a legitimate claim to being enrolled in research, there would have
to be an obligation on the part of the researcher to enroll that individual. But surely,
even if the case could be made that a researcher has an obligation to conduct a
particular study, he or she would have no obligation to enroll every individual in
that study. Were research to be organized so as to respect everyone’s alleged right to
participate in it, it would bear little resemblance to the enterprise we know today,
since the very point of research is to serve other purposes, recognized to be valuable
by society. After all, subjects are invited to participate in research not because they
want to participate, or because they will benefit from doing so, but because
researchers need data. The requirement of consent is in this context a protective
measure, not a practice aimed at promoting individual autonomy.
Obviously there may be a right to be included in research that offers a potential
benefit to the subject, for example, by means of experimental treatment, as David
Wendler has suggested [18]. This might simply be subsumed under the right to
health. Such a right would however be irrelevant to the issue at hand, as we are here
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only concerned with non-beneficial research. Another idea, also mentioned by
Wendler, is that a right might be violated when subjects are excluded from research
without good reason [18]. If a research subject is the victim of discrimination, for
example, it constitutes, by definition, a violation of the right to equal treatment.
Discrimination, however, is differential treatment that is not based on any morally
relevant differences between the individuals in question, and the choice to exclude
precisely those who cannot protect their own interests due to decisional incapacity
arguably does not fit that bill. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of
People with Disabilities, of course, with its article 12 requiring equal recognition
before the law, will (if interpreted along the lines of General comment 1) find it
discriminatory not to allow everyone, regardless of cognitive ability, to make up
their own minds regarding research participation [22]. That, however, would be a
different thing entirely, as from this perspective, the premise of the whole
discussion—that sometimes surrogate decision makers may have to make decisions
about research enrollment of decisionally incapacitated individuals—is rejected. All
in all, there simply is no acknowledged right to be enrolled in research that will be
violated when individuals admitted to be decisionally incapacitated are excluded,
whereas there is a generally affirmed right not to be experimented on without
consent—a right clearly at stake when judgments about the individual’s wishes are
uncertain or unreliable.
Implications
In a framework where respecting the decisionally incapacitated individuals’
hypothetical wishes regarding research participation takes central place, but where
there is also a non-negligible probability that surrogates may be wrong about those
wishes, we need principles that help us determine what mistakes would be the worst
to make. We have made the case that with respect to non-beneficial research, there
are important asymmetries between the two mistakes that the surrogate can make:
false positives and false negatives. These asymmetries, in turn, would seem to
support a particular piece of precautionary reasoning. Surrogates, unless special
circumstances suggest otherwise, should refuse to authorize research enrollment in
those situations in which there is a significant risk that a mistake about the
individual’s preferences will be made.11
What would the implications of this proposal be from a societal viewpoint?
Assume that based on precautionary reasoning, surrogates would systematically
refuse to authorize enrollment in non-beneficial research. Under current provisions,
this would imply that many seemingly valuable studies could not take off. This, in
turn, would in all likelihood imply that there will be little scientific progress on
many medical and other problems plaguing large and vulnerable patient popula-
tions. There are good grounds for taking measures to ensure that this scenario will
not materialize. It would be a scenario in which many people are significantly
11 There are indications that surrogates’ predictions of preferences regarding participating in research
that involve risks greater than minimal are not much more reliable than a coin flip [11].
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deprived of wellbeing that they could have been offered, and one in which certain
groups of future patients could possibly be said to be victims of discrimination.
There are thus both consequentialist and egalitarian reasons for allowing at least
some non-beneficial research on research subjects lacking capacity.12 However, the
present discussion does not concern whether society should have a policy where
such research is made possible; it concerns what moral grounds there are for
surrogate decision makers to authorize research enrollment in any individual case.
Society could certainly choose to restrict surrogates’ mandate under the relevant
circumstances, for example, by making room for exceptions to the requirement of
surrogate consent. In this article, we express no views on this option or, for that
matter, on how society in general should approach the problem.
Our point is just that when surrogate predictions about preferences regarding
research participation may prove inaccurate, one needs to assess the relative
seriousness of false positives and false negatives, and that surrogates who exercise
caution may well have to err on the side of non-enrollment. As already stated, in
suggesting this, we obviously assume that society does not call upon surrogates to
protect other parties’ interests too, in addition to those of the decisionally
incapacitated would-be research subject. It is central to the notion of a surrogate that
he or she is given the responsibility to serve the interests of the incapacitated
individual, and not anyone else’s. Were surrogates to be asked to balance the
interests of this individual against the interests of a greater population, of society or
some other party, they would rather turn into a one-person ethical review board.
That would make their role utterly unclear and, moreover, point to the need of a true
surrogate—someone whose job it is to protect the decisionally incapacitated
individual’s interests in particular.13
Have we considered that many people may be inclined to give their prospective
surrogates a very broad mandate? There is actually empirical support not only for
the assumption that many people seem to be prepared to give surrogates leeway in
making decisions about research participation on their behalf, but also for the fact
that this willingness to let surrogates deviate from what they would state as their
own preference may actually be strengthened after ‘‘democratic deliberation’’ [12].
While interesting, these findings have no bearing on the present point. In fact, it
would not even matter if one were to find out that surrogates would generally be
prepared to allow leeway. First, uncertainty will remain as to whether, in the case at
hand, the decisionally incapacitated individual would have given his or her
surrogate (some or complete) leeway; the possibility of erring on a wrong side
remains. Second, even if it were known with certainty that the individual concerned
12 Some commentators have argued that it is only fair, under certain circumstances, that subjects lacking
capacity participate in research, given what they receive from the society [23]. A more radical thesis is
defended by John Harris and Søren Holm [24], according to which, roughly, surrogates and society would
protect the interests of the decisionally incapacitated by discharging the latter’s (alleged) moral
obligations to participate in research. This proposal is obviously problematic for a number of reasons, and
would have far-reaching implications.
13 As suggested by an anonymous reviewer, it is an interesting empirical question to what extent
surrogates feel that they ought to take researchers’ or society’s interests into consideration, and if so,
whether this belief may actually affect the accuracy of their substituted judgments.
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did or would allow the surrogate leeway, this information alone would offer no
guidance as to what the surrogate ought to decide. The surrogate would know that
the individual was or would be okay with any responsibly made decision on the
issue of research inclusion, but he or she still would not know what that decision
should be.
Now, just what precaution dictates obviously depends on the relative weight
given to the various values involved, and on the probabilities of them being realized.
For expository reasons, we have mainly looked at the scenario where surrogate
accuracy may not be greater than chance, but in many cases, surrogates could
obviously do better than that. Imagine for purposes of argument that numbers do
make sense: the chance of being right about what the incapacitated individual would
have wanted could be, say, 60/40, or even better, 90/10, or any other estimate. For
someone who assigns a significantly greater value to satisfying a decisionally
incapacitated person’s hypothetical preferences than to safeguarding rights, non-
instrumentalization, and non-exposure to risks and burdens, a significant chance of
being right that this person would have wanted to take part in the study may well be
considered sufficient in any or all of those circumstances for authorizing enrollment;
the argument of this article certainly leaves this open.
To repeat, however, for any conclusions to be drawn about the legitimacy of
allowing the incapacitated individual to be part of a study, accuracy assessments
would have to be supplemented with evaluations of the seriousness of being
wrong in various ways. Unless surrogates could be considered completely certain
about what the individual would have wanted, that is, one would need some kind
of precautionary principle to provide the guidance that the basic decision-making
standards do not offer on their own. And more specifically, the greater the
uncertainty, the greater the relative value of the relevant kinds of autonomy would
need to be, given that false positives are associated with various downsides.
Again, we have not, in this article, attempted to establish what reliability level
would be enough to warrant authorizing inclusion. But anyone who believes that
the value of satisfying the individual’s prior or hypothetical wishes regarding
research enrollment is so great that surrogates ought to err on the side of inclusion
in any case in which it is more likely than not that he or she would have wanted
to be enrolled certainly has a burden of argument. Such a person quite likely faces
an uphill struggle, in our view, given not only that the moral force of prior or
merely hypothetical wishes is contested but also that the positive choice of
participating in research is something to which we are not generally afforded an
autonomy right.
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